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Abstract 
Survey evidence suggests that managers voluntarily disclose information, particularly earnings guidance, with an 
aim toward dampening share price volatility.  Yet, consultants and influential institutions advise against providing 
guidance — citing fears of litigation and market penalties associated with missed earnings targets, as well as a lack 
of evidence that disclosure actually curbs volatility.  Furthermore, recent research links guidance to increased 
volatility and heightened crash risk.  Hence, many argue that guidance not only fails to promote tranquility but may 
actually prompt turbulence.  In this paper, we consider the interplay between guidance and volatility.  Consistent 
with the notion that volatility does indeed factor into managers’ decisions to supply earnings guidance, we provide 
evidence of a link between increased volatility and the likelihood that a manager chooses to “bundle” a forecast with 
the firm’s earnings announcement in the current quarter.  In particular, our findings indicate that firms in more 
volatile information environments exhibit a general reticence to offer guidance, but given a recent spike in volatility, 
managers are more likely to jump in with a forecast seemingly in an effort to calm the market.  Subsequent tests 
indicate that managers’ efforts do not go unrewarded, as we document a greater post-announcement run-down in 
volatility for guiding firms.  Taken collectively, this evidence supports the view that managers can and do positively 
shape their firms’ information environments by an earnings guidance. 
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1. Introduction 
No managerial communication arouses such negative reaction, even furty, as earnings 
guidance does. In 2006, the prestigious Conference Board urged managers to stop issuing 
quarterly guidance because it encourages a short-term focus, detrimental to firms’ ability manage 
for the long-term (“Revising Stock Market Short-Termism,” 2006). Also in 2006, the CFA 
Institute in conjunction with the Business Roundtable, in a dramatic “Call for Action,” implored 
managers to “End the practice of providing quarterly guidance,” because it’s an “unproductive 
and wasted effort by corporations…,and causes…neglect of long-term business growth…” In 
2007, a bipartisan commission established by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce also called for the 
end of the earnings guidance practice, to be substituted by an explanation of the firm’s long-term 
goals and strategies (The Commission on the regulation of U.S. Capital Markets in the 21st 
Century, 2007). 
Not to be left behind, the leading consulting company McKiney made its view about 
guidance clear in a report to clients: “The Misguided Practice of Earnings Guidance.” (2006), 
claiming that guidance doesn’t provide any economic benefit, including the tampering of share 
volatility. Warren Buffett publicly voiced his antagonism to guidance; Google’s founders 
declared at the IPO that the search firm will not guide; and even Al Gore urged managers to 
cease guiding investors. And the list of guidance bashers goes on.  
While the frequency of quarterly guidance decreased by about 30% in 2007-2008, mainly 
due to difficulties to predict firm performance during the financial crisis and the ensuing 
recession, close to 800 public companies still regularly provide quarterly guidance and about 
1,800 companies provide annual and/or quarterly guidance, out of roughtly 5,500 U.S. public 
companies—clearly, a substantial number of guiders. Apparently, guiders do benefit from the 
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practice. But what exactly are those benefits? We focus in this study on a major potential 
benefit—reducing share volatility. 
Managers often express concern with excessive share volatility and survey evidence 
indicates that managers voluntarily disclose information aimed at dampening share price 
volatility (Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal 2005; McKinsey survey 2006).  Indeed, executives 
frequently claim that they provide earnings guidance in order to reduce the volatility of their 
stock (Johnson 2009; National Investor Relations Institute 2009).  In contrast to managers’ 
claims,some work links guidance with increased volatility and heightened crash risk (Rogers, 
Skinner and Van Buskirk 2009; Hamm, Li and Ng 2012), while other work suggests that 
opportunistic managers provide guidance in an intentional effort to foster uncertainty in order to 
enhance stock option gains (So 2012).  Hence, recent research argues that guidance not only fails 
to promote tranquility but may actually prompt turbulence. The stage is thus set for a 
comprehensive examination of the relation between quarterly earnings guidance and share 
volatility. 
In this paper, we consider the interplay between guidance and volatility.  We provide 
evidence of a link between increased volatility and the likelihood that managers choose to 
“bundle” a forecast with the firm’s earnings announcement.  In general, we observe a negative 
relation between the level of share volatility and the incidence of guidance, that is, volatile firms 
guide less frequently, presumably because they find it harder to predict future performance. 
However, the relation between volatility and guidance turns positive when there is a pre-earnings 
announcement run-up in volatility.  Thus, a spike in volatility triggers the choice to bundle a 
forecast with the earnings release, presumably, reflecting managers’ efforts to quiet the turmoil 
in the stock.  Inconsistent with prior research which suggests that guidance actually fuels 
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volatility, we find no evidence that the decision to guide in a given quarter enhances volatility.  
Indeed, we document the opposite:  guidance-earnings bundling is associated with a larger 
reduction in volatility in the days following the announcement of earnings than non-bundled 
earnings releases. 
Our analyses examine a sample of 107,307 quarterly earnings announcements that were 
made in the decade since Regulation Fair Disclosure (“Reg FD”) took effect in October of 2000.  
In line with recent findings, we note that over 30% (32,910) of those announcements coincide 
with the issuance of forward-looking, bundled earnings guidance (Anilowski, Feng and Skinner 
2007; Rogers and Van Buskirk 2012).  In our empirical tests, we compare the volatility dynamics 
surrounding the quarterly earnings announcements bundled with guidance to earnings 
announcements without guidance (i.e., bundled versus nonbundled earnings announcements). 
Evidence indicates that increasingly guidance is provided with the earnings announcement 
(Anilowski, Feng and Skinner, 2007; Rogers and Van Buskirk, 2012). Our focus in this study on 
bundled guidance thus covers the large majority of guidance cases in practice. 
Our finding that a volatility runup prior to the earnings announcements leads to guidance-
earnings bundling holds after controlling for known determinants of bundled guidance—most 
notably, the current quarter’s earnings news and the firm’s guidance choices in the prior quarter.  
The evidence of a link between run-ups in volatility and guidance is consistent with either (1) the 
market anticipating the act of bundling (and its associated impact on prices) or (2) managers 
reacting to the rising volatility by providing guidance.   
We attempt to distinguish between these two explanations for our findings by focusing on 
investors’ ability to forecast bundling (the first explanation). Examining firms which guided 
within the past 12 quarters, we find that the majority of firms do not guide every quarter.  Of the 
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47,168 firm-quarter observations where managers have recently (last 12 quarters) guided, only 
50% guided in the same quarter of the prior year and approximately 25% either remained silent 
or offered a single forecast in the past 4 quarters.  This guiding irregularity indicates that 
investors cannot perfectly anticipate the guidance. Importantly, when we relate the likelihood of 
a firm providing guidance and the volatility run-up prior to earnings announcement, we find a 
very low correlation, questioning the validity of the first explanation above (that the volatility 
run-up is in anticipation of the guidance). Furthermore, when we limit our analysis to recent 
guiders (i.e., focusing on variation in guidance behavior while attempting to limit variation in the 
extent to which the market anticipates the presence of a forecast), we again detect a link between 
recent run-ups in volatility and managers’ propensity to bundle in the current quarter.  Thus, 
consistent with managers’ claim that they guide to suppress volatility, we find that the choice to 
bundle in a particular quarter is indeed related to recent spike in volatility for firms committed to 
guidance. 
If a volatility runup leads managers to issue guidance, the next question is: is the 
guidance effective in arresting volatility? Examining movement in volatility on the day of the 
earnings announcement and in the days immediately thereafter, we find a significant decrease in 
volatility for the guiders.  Regardless of the nature of the forecast news, positive or negative, and 
controlling for both the earnings news released and the pre-announcement run-up in volatility (as 
well as other factors), we detect no difference in volatility movement on the day of the earnings 
announcement when we compare bundled quarters to non-bundled quarters. Hence, we definitely 
don’t find evidence that guidance increases volatility.  Further, in the subsequent trading days, 
our evidence indicates that the bundling of earnings guidance with the regular announcement of 
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earnings is associated with a greater post-announcement reduction in volatility, than for non-
bundled earnings. Our findings thus contradict the guidance naysayers. 
The remainder of this paper progresses as follows.  Section 2 reviews the relevant 
literature and presents our predictions. Section 3 discusses our approach to sample selection and 
our empirical methods.  Section 4 presents the descriptive statistics and empirical results of the 
study.  Finally, Section 5 concludes with a summary and discussion. 
 
2. Related Literature and Hypotheses 
Investor uncertainty and, by extension, stock price volatility fluctuate considerably 
around earnings-relevant information releases.  Patell and Wolfson (1976, 1981) document that 
option implied volatility increases in the days leading up to quarterly earnings announcements 
and collapses thereafter.  Focusing attention on “unbundled” management forecasts (i.e., 
earnings guidance issued apart from the regular announcement of earnings), Rogers, Skinner and 
Van Buskirk (2009) also observe a rise in volatility prior to guidance, but, in contrast to Patell 
and Wolfson, report that volatility remains elevated in the post-guidance days and conclude that 
these forecasts increase short-term volatility.  Those unbundled guidances, however, are now 
rare—nearly one third of all recent earnings announcements bundle the release of current quarter 
results with forward-looking guidance (Anilowski, Feng and Skinner 2007; Rogers and Van 
Buskirk 2012)—leading us to focus on bundled guidance.  We ask: Does the pre-earnings-
announcement spike in the level of volatility, trigger managers’ decisions to guide in a particular 
quarter?  Furthermore, we ask,does the post-earnings-announcement decrease in volatility differ 
depending upon the presence or absence of guidance?   
 6 
 
Prior work indicates that managers tend to disclose more when earnings are less volatile 
(Waymire 1985) and easier to predict (Chen, Matsumoto, and Rajgopal 2011). Consistent with 
this notion, Cotter, Tuna, and Wysocki (2006) find that “management guidance is more likely 
when ... analysts’ forecast dispersion is low.” Similarly, Houston, Lev, and Tucker (2010) argue 
that forecast dispersion reflects greater difficulty in predicting earnings and, accordingly, 
document a positive relation between increased dispersion and the likelihood that a manager 
stops guiding. Collectively, these studies indicate that managers will be less likely to bundle a 
forecast with the firm’s earnings announcement when pre-announcement levels of volatility are 
high, which leads us to our first hypothesis: 
H1:  High pPreannouncement levels of share volatility are associated with a 
decreased likelihood of bundling guidance with earnings. 
 
At the same time, survey evidence suggests that managers guide with an aim toward 
dampening share price volatility (Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal 2005; McKinsey survey 2006).  
Indeed, executives frequently indicate that they commit to guidance in order to constrain the 
volatility in their stock (Johnson 2009; National Investor Relations Institute 2009).  This suggests 
that a pre-announcement rises in volatility will trigger managers to provide guidance in an effort 
to dampen the rising volatility. 
H2:  Preannouncement rises in share volatility are associated with an increased 
likelihood of bundling guidance with earnings. 
 
Shifting attention from the role of pre-announcement volatility increase to the 
consequences of guidance, we note that prior evidence suggests that guidance may not achieve 
managers’ intentions.  Early work by Bushee and Noe (2000) links improvements in disclosure 
with increased stock volatility, while  more recent work links guidance with increased volatility 
and heightened crash risk (Rogers, Skinner and Van Buskirk 2009; Hamm, Li and Ng 2012). 
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Other work suggests that opportunistic managers provide guidance in order to foster uncertainty 
(So 2012).  Collectively, these studies suggest that guidance not only fails to decrease volatility, 
but may actually increase it.  Thus, the decision to bundle might actually slow down the 
previously documented decrease in volatility in the days immediately following the 
announcement of earnings (Patell and Wolfson 1976, 1981). Thus,  
H3:  The post-earnings-announcement decrease in volatility is slowed down by the 
presence of a guidance. 
 
    
 
3. Data 
We begin our data collection by obtaining the report date of quarterly earnings (RDQ) for 
all firm quarters in Compustat for the period of 2001 through the end of 2010.  To these firm-
quarter observations, we add guidance data from First Call’s Company Issued Guidelines files.  
We code a variable (GUIDANCE) to indicate when a management forecast occurs during the 5 
trading days centered on the earnings announcement.  We also code a number of indicator 
variables that reflect the firm’s guidance history prior to the current quarter’s earnings 
announcement: GUIDE_CQTR reflects whether the firm previously provided guidance for the 
current quarter’s earnings, while GUIDE_PRIOR reflects whether the firm bundled earnings 
guidance with the prior quarter’s earnings announcement.  Expanding the focus from just the 
prior quarter, we code two additional indicator variables that aim to capture managers’ 
willingness to use guidance to communicate with the market in the past:  GUIDE_HISTORY 
equals one for firms with at least one earnings guidance prior to the current quarter’s earnings 
announcement; while SILENT_12Q equals one for firms with no earnings guidance in their 
history for at least the past 12 quarters. 
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Next, we collect analyst forecast data from I/B/E/S using the unadjusted detail file three 
days prior to each earnings announcement.  From this file, we derive the consensus analyst 
forecast (typically the median), the standard deviation of analyst forecasts, and the number of 
analyst forecasts conditional on the analyst forecast being no more than 90 days old (i.e., non-
stale).  The median analyst forecast, combined with the actual earnings for a given quarter, 
provides a history of earnings surprises.  Specifically we measure each quarter’s surprise 
(SURPRISE) as the reported actual earnings (obtained from Compustat quarterly files) minus the 
most recent median analyst estimates, deflated by stock price 3 trading days prior to the earnings 
release date. The dollar earnings surprise (actual earnings minus the median analyst forecast) is 
divided by the stock price three days prior to the earnings release to create a Standardized 
Unexpected Earnings (SUE). 
  In addition to actual and forecasted earnings information, we collect share price, return, 
number of shares and volume data from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) 
database.  We use these data to compute the market value of a firm’s equity each quarter, the 90-
day return ending three days prior to the earnings release date, and the standard deviation of 
actual returns over that 90-day period.   
  Finally, we gather close-of-day implied volatility data from Option Metrics.  Specifically, 
we collect implied volatilities on 30-day standardized at-the-money options during 15 days 
before and after each earnings date.  This allows us to determine an average level of implied 
volatility in the days before quarterly earnings release and the changes in implied volatility over 
various time periods before and after quarterly earnings releases.  We also collect closing levels 
of the Chicago Board Option’s Exchange volatility index (VIX) from their website during the 
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three-day window centered on an earnings date. We define all the variables used in our analyses 
in the Appendix. 
 
4. Our Findings 
This section reports the results of our two-pronged investigation: the association between 
pre-announcement changes in volatility and the decision to bundle guidance with earnings 
releases and the association between post-announcement changes in volatility and the existence 
of guidance in the earnings release.  First, we provide a statistical description of the data. 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Table 1 summarizes the descriptive statistics of relevant variables for the 107,307 sample 
observations.  Panel A provides unconditional statistics, while Panel B conditions the data on 
whether the earnings announcement is or is not associated with management guidance.   
[Insert Table 1.] 
Notably, almost 31% of quarterly earnings announcements are bundled with guidance.  There is 
a certain consistency in guidance behavior, since 31% of the earning announcements also had 
guidance bundled with the prior quarter’s earnings announcements, and about 27% of this 
quarter’s earnings releases were the subject of prior managerial forecasts.  Conversely, 56% of 
earnings announcements have no management guidance in the previous twelve quarters.  Of 56% 
of earnings reports released following at least 12 quarters without guidance, only 3% (not 
tabulated in Table 1) bundle guidance with earnings.  Thus, while there is some consistency in 
the practice of guidance, it is far from perfect. 
 The mean (median) SUE for the sample firms is -0.006 (0.000), and twenty percent of the 
earnings announcements are losses.  About 58% of earnings announcements exceed the median 
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analyst forecast by an SUE of at least +0.0001, whereas 31% of the actuals fall below the median 
analyst forecast of -0.0001, leaving about 11% of earnings exactly meeting the analysts’ 
consensus forecast.  This bias toward “beats” is consistent with prior research.   
 Examining Panel B, we find statistically significant differences between the means and 
medians of the bundled and non-bundled earnings announcements for all the variables tabulated.  
Specifically, managements issuing positive earnings news (both current and past)—surprise 
variable—are more likely to bundle guidance with the earnings release than managements of 
firms with less favorable earnings news.   Guiders tend to have greater market capitalizations and 
are more widely followed by analysts than non-guiders.  There also tends to be less disagreement 
among analysts following firms that guide than those that do not guide, suggesting that guidance 
reduces investors’ uncertainty.  Interestingly, firms that do not guide are associated with larger 
pre-announcement stock price increases than firms that do guide.  Combined with the fact that 
non-guiders are more likely to disappoint with the earnings announcement, the larger stock price 
run-up prior to the earnings release exaggerate the disappointment. Table 2 provides the 
correlations among the examined variables. 
 Table 3 provides descriptive statistics for the volatility measures we use in our analyses.  
Because listed options exist only for a sub-sample of firms, we have only 72,123 observations 
(out of a total of ____) after requiring Option Metrics data. 
[Insert Table 2.] 
On average, the realized stock price volatility (standard deviation of daily returns), svol_level, in 
the 90 days prior to the earnings announcement, is 3% per day, or about 47.6% annualized 
(assuming identically and independently distributed returns) to 252 trading days in a year.  
implied volatility, ivol_level, on average, is 49%.  As noted in prior literature, implied volatility 
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rises in the days prior to an earnings announcement (by 1.8% over three days and 3.1% over 15 
days, on average) and falls substantially on the earnings announcement day (2.5% on average) 
and the immediately following days (by over 6%).  
 From Panel B of Table 3, we find that firms choosing to bundle guidance with earnings 
announcements tend to have lower levels of volatility (measured by either realized or implied 
volatility, by means or medians), but larger increases in volatility immediately prior to the 
earnings release.  The first result is consistent with prior work (see, Waymire (1985) and 
Bozanic, Roulstone, and Van Buskirk (2012)).  The larber volatility increase prior to earnings 
announcements of guiders (0.042 vs. 0.023, for guiders and non-guiders, respectively, for the 15 
days prior to earnings release, Δivol_pre15d) suggests that the decision to guide is related to the 
volatility increase; a finding not reported earlier.  We also document (see Δivol_post) 
significantly larger decreases in volatility post-earnings-announcement for guiding firms (around 
11%, consisting of 2.8% on the earnings announcement day and over 8% in the days thereafter) 
than for earnings announcements not accompanied by guidance (less than 8%).  On average, 
firm-quarters with bundled earnings-guidance, are associated with a more negative net change in 
implied volatility (measured either from three or 15 days before the earnings release dates to 
three or 15 days afterwards) than for firms without earnings guidance.  For example, the mean 
seven-day net change in volatility from three days before the announcement through three days 
afterwards is -5.8% for non-guiders and -7.2 for guiders (the difference is statistically 
significant). 
 It may be argued that the higher pre-announcement increase in volatility for guiders 
reflect investors’ expectation of the release of guidance. But in Panel C of Table 3, we note that 
the volatility differences hold even when we focus our attention on firms for which investors 
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may expect a guidance.  For this analysis, we use the 48,168 observations where the firm 
provided guidance at least once in the prior twelve quarters.  We find that such firms, all with a 
recent history of guiding, are less likely to guide in a given quarter if the level of realized or 
implied volatility is high, and more likely to guide if there is a larger increase in implied 
volatility in the days immediately prior to the earnings announcement.  Likewise, the post-
announcement volatility decrease is greater and the 7- or 31-day net change in implied volatility 
is larger for guiders than for non-guiders. It thus appears that guidance is a response to a 
volatility spike. 
 Finally, in Panel D of Table 3, we condition the statistics on the sign of the earnings news 
(negative announcements are those with a SUE < -0.0001, and positive with a SUE > +0.0001).  
We note that regardless of the earnings news, firm-quarters with higher levels of volatility are 
less likely to guide, while firms with greater increases in pre-announcement volatility are more 
likely to guide, and firm-quarters with guidance are associated with larger decreases in post-
release volatility (and more negative net volatility changes) than firm-quarters without guidance. 
Thus, the specific earnings message doesn’t affect our main findings. Nor does the guidance 
message, as seen in Table 4. For each state of earnings (negative, neutral, and positive), we 
disaggregate the guidance to negative, neutral, and positive, relative to the consensus forecast for 
the guided quarter. First thing to note is that the majority of guidance cases for each earnings 
message are negative (warnings). Regarding our major finding—that guidance is associated with 
a volatility spike before the earnings announcement—it holds for each of the three types of 
guidance. Specifically, for each of the three guidance messages, the pre-announcement volatility 
increases (Δivol_pre15d and Δivol_pre3d, for 15 and 3 days prior to announcement) are larger 
than the volatility increases of the unbundled (no-guidance) cases (the only exception: positive 
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earnings and positive guidance, 15 days prior). Also, without exception, the post-earnings 
announcement volatility decreases, both over three and 15 days, are larger for negative, neutral 
and positive guidance, than non-guided earnings releases. Thus, we find consistent regularities: 
the observed volatility changes from before to after the earnings release are unaffected by the 
earnings or the guidance message. We now turn to a multivariate analysis. 
 
What Affects the Decision to Guide? 
 We begin by investigating the decision of mangers to bundle guidance with an earnings 
announcement.  Based on prior research1, we anticipate that this decision is influenced by past 
guidance practice, and the information environment of the firm.  To control for past guidance 
practice, we create a binary variable that takes a value of one if management issued guidance 
concerning the prior quarter’s earnings and another binary variable taking a value of one if 
management issued guidance during the current quarter.  We expect that both of these variables 
are positively correlated with the decision to bundle guidance for future quarter(s) with the 
current quarter’s earnings announcement.   That is, we expect that guiding firms tend to continue 
to guide and that non-guiders tend to not guide. 
 Management’s guidance decision might also be related to the message of the current 
quarter’s earnings.  To increase the credibility of a positive earnings surprise, manager may 
bundle the earnings news with guidance, whereas negative earnings surprises often lead 
managers to curtail guidance (Houson, Lev, and Tucker, 2010). Using the Standardized 
                                                 
1 For example, Houston, Lev, and Tucker (2010), Tang (2011), and Chen, Matsumato, and 
Rajgopal (2011) study the decision by managers to cease giving earnings guidance and find roles 
for guidance history, current and past earnings, the firm’s information environment measured by 
firm characteristics and financial analyst coverage variables, and own realized volatility levels.  
Kim, Pandit and Wasley (2012) demonstrate the importance to control for market-wide volatility. 
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Unexpected Earnings as our measure of earnings surprise, we denote SUE values less than -
0.0001 as negative surprises, values between -0.0001 and 0.0001 as no surprise, and values 
exceeding 0.0001 as positive surprises.  We create two binary variables, one that identifies 
negative surprises and one that identifies positive surprises.  Prior literature finds that losses are 
treated differently by the market, so we create a binary variable to identify instances where the 
firm-quarter’s actual earnings number is less than zero.  We also look back four quarters to 
create a history of the firm’s earnings performance relative to expectations by computing the 
proportion of the last four quarters in which the firm’s SUE exceeded -0.0001, i.e., the fraction 
of quarters where the firm met or beat analyst expectations.  Finally, we control for the size of 
the earnings surprise by taking the absolute value of the SUE. 
 We characterize the information environment of the firm by several variables: The log of 
the market capitalization is included, as large firms have a richer information environment than 
small firms.  The log of the number of analyst estimates and the standard deviation of those 
estimates are also included as information variables.   These variables represent the amount of 
private information generation about a firm and the apparent agreement (forecast dispersion) 
with regard to that private information.  To address possible information leakage prior to the 
earnings announcements, we include the return on the firm’s stock during the 90 days prior to 
announcement (roughly since the last earnings announcement). 
 Lastly, we reflect in the regression the association between share volatility and the 
decision to guide.  Postulating both a levels effect and an effect of changes in volatility, we 
formulate two variables.  For the levels variables, we compute the standard deviation of daily 
returns during the 90 days prior to the earnings announcement (ending three days prior), and use 
the implied daily volatility from a standardized 30-day at-the-money option from 15 days before 
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the earnings announcement through 15 days after the announcement.  We focus on standardized 
30-day implied volatilities from Option Metrics as they provide the best high frequency measure 
of the market’s assessment of stock price volatility.  To isolate firm-specific volatility effects, we 
also control for the level of market-wide volatility, using the volatility index (VIX).   
 We estimate the following regression with year and industry fixed effects, 
Guide = α + β1(guide_current_quarter) + β2(guide_prior_quarter) + β3(positive_surpise) + 
β4(negative_surprise) + β5(absolute_surprise) + β6(loss) + β7(forecast_dispersion) + 
β8(prior_returns) + β9(log_market_value_equity) + β10(log_number_of_estimates) + 
β11(proportion_meet_or_beat) + ε,         (1) 
 
where: 
 
Guide = 1 if the current quarter’s earnings release is bundled with guidance for future quarters 
and 0 otherwise, 
 
guide_current_quarter = 1 if the firm guided with respect to the current quarter in the past and 0 
otherwise, 
 
guide_prior_quarter = 1 if the firm provided a bundled earnings announcement in the prior 
quarter and 0 otherwise, 
 
positive_surprise = 1 if the SUE > 0.0001 and 0 otherwise; 
 
negative_surprise = 1 if the SUE < -0.0001 and 0 otherwise; 
 
absolute_surprice = the absolute value of the SUE; 
 
loss = 1 if the current quarter’s earnings are negative and 0 otherwise; 
 
forecast_dispersion = the standard deviation of the individual analyst forecasts existing at the 
time of the earnings release; 
 
prior_return = the return on the stock in the 90 days prior to the earnings announcement ending 
three days prior to the earnings release; 
 
log_market_value_equity = log(share price three days prior to the earnings * shares outstanding); 
 
log_number_of_estimates = log(number of individual analyst estimates existing at the time of the 
earnings announcement; and  
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proportion_meet_or_beat = the fraction of the prior four quarters in which the firm’s SUE 
exceeded -0.0001. 
 
We then add variables measuring the volatility level, pre-release changes in volatility and 
variables intended to focus our attention on the subsample of firms most likely to respond to 
volatility dynamics around earnings releases with earnings guidance.   All variable values are 
Winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile values. 
 Estimates of regression (1) are reported in Table 5.  We report six specifications of the 
regression. 
[Insert Table 5.] 
Initial regression estimations use all the 107,307 sample firm-quarters.    When we add implied 
volatility levels from Option Metrics, our sample size decreases to 72,123 firm-quarters as not all 
firms have traded options.  Of these, 27,046 firm quarters include earnings guidance.   
 In column (1) of Table 5, we find that the majority of our predicted associations are 
confirmed.  Specifically, guidance history is positively correlated with the decision to include 
guidance with the current quarter’s earnings; the coefficient estimates on guide_cqtr and 
bundled_prior are reliably positive.  The direction and magnitude of the current quarter’s 
earnings news also matters.  Managers are more likely to guide if the current and past quarters’ 
earnings news beats analysts’ forecasts and are (weakly) less likely to bundle if the earnings miss 
the consensus.  The negative earnings news result is reliably negative only if the firm reports a 
loss.  For large surprises in either direction (|surprise|), managers are less likely to guide.  
Managers are more likely to include a guidance with earnings if the firm has a larger market 
capitalization (consistent with the increased frequency of bundlers for the Option Metrics sub-
sample); when the firm is followed by more analysts; or when the analysts are in more 
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agreement.  The general picture emerging is that guidance is associated with more informed and 
transparent information environment. Which is the cause and which is the effect is yet to be 
determined. 
 In columns (2) and (3) of Table 5, we control for market volatility (measured with VIX) 
and add the level of individual stock price volatility, measured as the realized volatility in 
column (2) and the implied volatility in column (3), to the previously included variables.  
Specifically,  
svol_level = the level of stock price volatility, is measured as the standard deviation of stock 
prices in the 90 days prior to the earnings announcement (ending three days prior) or, 
alternatively, the average implied volatility, ivol_level, on the standardized 30-day option on the 
stock in the three day period, and alternatively over a 15-day period prior to the earnings 
announcement.  
Regardless of whether we measure volatility with share volatility (column (2)) or implied 
volatility (column (3)), as the level of volatility increases, firms are less likely to provide 
guidance.  This is consistent with the hypothesis that managements decline to guide in situations 
that are particularly difficult to forecast.  Using realized volatility, the previously documented 
results are maintained.  With implied volatility as our measure of stock price volatility, the 
number of analysts variable loses statistical significance in explaining the decision to bundle.  
Adding the level of volatility to the regression specification adds only marginally to the 
explanatory power of the model. 
 In columns (4) and (5) of Table 5, we investigate the effect of the pre-earnings-
announcement change in implied volatility on the decision to bundle.   We anticipate that 
bundling is more highly associated with rising levels of pre-earnings volatility, particularly for 
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firms with a history of guiding, than for firms that do not guide.  This may reflect be a 
management reaction to the rising volatility or it might be a market anticipation of receiving both 
actual earnings and guidance as to future earnings for the guiding firms.  The guiding history is 
determined by whether firms have or have not guided in the past twelve quarters.  Specifically, 
we define a variable, 
silent_12q = 1 if the firm has not issued guidance in any of the twelve quarters preceding the 
quarter of interest.2  This guidance history variable is interacted with the change in implied 
volatility prior to the earnings announcement. 
 
 
The estimates in columns 4 and 5 show that the pre-announcement increase in volatility, 
Δivol_pre, is positively associated with the likelihood of guidance, regardless of whether we 
measure the volatility run-up over three or 15 days.  Moreover, this association is confined to 
firms with a recent history of guidance, since when the pre-announcement volatility change is 
interacted with silent_12q, we find a negative coefficient estimate of sufficient magnitude to 
swamp the positive coefficient estimate on the volatility run-up.  That is, rising pre-
announcement volatility is associated with an increased likelihood of guidance overall, but is 
associated with a decreased likelihood of guidance for those firms that have not guided in the 
recent past.  Not surprisingly, the main effect on silent_12q is negative; firms that have not 
provided guidance before are less likely to provide it now.  The addition of the pre-
announcement implied volatility change does improve the explanatory power of the model, with 
the pseudo-R2 rising from less than .64 to over .67.  That represents a modest improvement, but 
most of the explanatory power is provided by past bundling behavior. 
                                                 
2 We construct similar variables for eight and four quarters of silence.  Conclusions are not 
sensitive to which variable we use to measure “recent” guider. 
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 It may be argued that the decision to guide is endogenous and that guiding and non-
guiding firms are inherently different and should not be combined in a single regression. 
Accordingly, in column (6), we analyze only firms that have provided guidance at least once in 
the three years prior to the quarter of interest (i.e., silent_12q = 0).  This reduces our sample size 
to 47,168.  Given that we are focusing here on firms with a recent guidance history, we no longer 
use the “silent” variable to distinguish between firms with a guiding history and those without 
such a history.  Notably, our results are maintained; the likelihood of bundling is negatively 
associated with the level of volatility and positively associated with pre-announcement changes 
in volatility.   
In summary, after controlling for various variables found in prior research to influence 
the decision by management to bundle earnings guidance with quarterly earnings releases, we 
find that increases in volatility prior to the earnings announcement are positively associated with 
guidance.  This might be due either to managers trying to mitigate the volatility spike by 
guidance, or the market anticipating additional volatility associated with a management forecast 
in the upcoming earnings release.  However, the fact that this association is observed when 
narrowing the sample to only those firms with a recent history of guidance (column 6), and, 
therefore, firms that the market could anticipate guiding, is more consistent with the first 
explanation above, namely, that guidance is a response to a volatility runup. We now move from 
the pre-earnings release period to the post-release period. 
  
The Change in Implied Volatility on the Earnings Announcement Day 
First, we examine the change in implied volatility on the day the earnings are announced.  
Of primary interest to our investigation is whether firm-quarters with bundled earnings-guidance 
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differ systematically in the volatility change from firm-quarters without guidance.  Therefore, we 
include the binary variable bundled, the dependent variable in our prior analysis, as an 
explanatory variable in the current analysis, and designate the volatility change on the 
announcement day as the dependent variable.  In addition to noting whether the current-quarter 
earnings announcement contained guidance for future quarters or not, we suspect that the 
earnings-day change in volatility depends on the earnings news, the forecast news, the releasing 
firm’s information environment, and the prior level of volatility.  To measure the surprise in the 
announced earnings, we use the absolute value of the SUE.  To further study the bundled 
earnings announcement, we use the First Call/CIG categorization of the forecast news to create 
binary variables that designate positive, neutral and negative news.3  The firm’s information 
environment is proxied by the number of analysts providing earnings forecasts, the dispersion of 
the consensus analyst forecast, and the equity market capitalization of the firm.  We also control 
for the market-wide volatility effects by including the VIX index level and the change in the VIX 
in the days prior to the earnings release.  In order to estimate the effect of own-firm volatility on 
the magnitude of the announcement-day change in volatility we employ the average level of the 
30-day standardized option implied volatility in the five trading days prior to the earnings 
announcement.  Thus, we estimate the following regression equation: 
Δivol_rdq = α + β1(surprise) + β2(guidance) + β3(log mve) + β4(log numest) +  β5(dispersion) + 
β6(log Δvix) + β7(VIX_level) + β8(ivol_level) β9( Δivol_pre3d)  + ε,   (2) 
 
where: 
 
Δivol_rdq  = the percentage change in implied volatility from the close of trading one day prior 
to the earnings announcement through the close of trading the day of the announcement; 
 
                                                 
3 Results are robust to using the Rogers and Van Buskirk (2012) methodology to categorize 
forecast news conditional on the news contained in earnings. 
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surprise = the absolute value of the actual quarterly earnings less the median non-stale analyst 
earnings forecast divided by the stock price three days before the earnings release (i.e., |SUE|); 
 
guidance = a binary variable taking on a value of 1 if the firm issued earnings guidance for a 
future quarter with two days of the quarterly earnings release; 
 
log (mve) = the natural log of the market capitalization of the firm; 
 
log (numest) = the natural log of the number of analysts providing non-stale forecasts (note that 
this must be at least two to produce a standard deviation); 
 
dispersion = the standard deviation of non-stale analyst earnings forecasts three days before the 
earnings release (implying that a firm-quarter must have at least two non-stale analysts’ 
forecasts); 
 
VIX_level = the Chicago Board Options Exchange VIX (implied volatility of the S&P500 Index) 
the day of the earnings release; 
 
log(ΔVIX) = the percent change in the VIX measured one day after the earnings release relative 
to one day prior to the earnings release. 
 
ivol_level = the average of the implied volatility for a standardized 30-day at-the-money option 
in the five days prior to an earnings release; and 
 
Δivol_pre3d = the percent change in the implied volatility for a standardized 30-day at-the-
money option in the three days prior to an earnings release (results are robust to using the 15-day 
change). 
  
Fixed effects for year and industry classification (two-digit SICs) also are included in the  
 
regression.   
 
 Of particular interest is the sign of the estimated guidance regression coefficient, β2.  If 
earnings guidance triggers a volatility increase, as suggested by certain recent research, we 
would expect a positive and significant β2 coefficient. (Note that the prior evidence on guiding 
increasing volatility refer to the minority of guidances not released with earnings 
announcements.) However, as made clear by the estimates reported in Table 6, the β2 coefficient 
is statistically insignificant for negative, neutral, and positive earnings news. We thus don’t find 
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any evidence indicating that guidance enhances share volatility relative to unguided earnings 
announcements on the earnings announcement day. 
[Insert Table 6.] 
We further find in Table 6 that higher levels of pre-announcement volatility and higher pre-
announcement run-ups in volatility are associated with larger decreases in announcement-day 
volatility, – most likely indicating that earnings announcements relieve more volatility when the 
market is most uncertain about earnings.  Most of the coefficient estimates on the control 
variables in Table 6 have signs consistent with our expectations. 
 To further explore the impact of guidance on the announcement day volatility we 
examine whether differences can be detected between the guidance conveying positive, neutral, 
or negative news.  We find that none of the estimated guidance coefficients are significant at 
traditional levels, except that associated with neutral forecast news associated with positive 
earnings news.  The positive coefficient in that case suggests that this specific combination of 
news (out of nine combinations; 4.6% of our sample) is correlated with higher announcement-
day volatility.  Other than that particular combination, guidance seems to be unrelated to the 
volatility change on the earnings release day. 
The Change in Implied Volatility in the Days Subsequent to the Earnings Announcement 
 Table 7 reports on an important phase of this study—the change in volatility in the days 
following the earnings announcement, with a particular interest in whether earnings releases 
bundled with guidance are associated with larger declines in volatility than earnings releases 
without guidance.  We estimate an equation similar to equation (2).  Here, however, the 
dependent variable is the percent change in the implied volatility over the three days after the 
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earnings announcement from the day of the earnings announcement.  We include in the 
regression the earnings day change in implied volatility as a control variable.   
[Insert Table 7.] 
It is evident from Table 7 that the firm-quarters identified with guidance (regardless of 
the news contained in the forecast) have larger post-earnings announcement decreases in 
volatility than firm-quarters without guidance.  Stated differently, guidance is associated with 
subsequent lower implied volatility than non-guidance.  This result holds after controlling for 
positive, negative and neutral earnings news, and the change in volatility levels leading up to the 
earnings release. The clear message is that bundling guidance with earnings announcement is 
associated with larger decreases in post-earnings announcement volatility than unbundled 
earnings releases. 
 
5. Conclusion 
In this study, we consider the interplay between guidance and volatility.  The major 
reason for this investigation is the tension between managers’ claims that a major reason for 
earnings guidance is to arrest share volatility, and certain recent evidence suggesting that 
guidance increases volatility. Since currently, the large majority of guidance cases are released 
with the quarterly earnings announcement, we focus on these bundled earnings-guidance cases. 
Consistent with the notion that volatility does indeed factor into managers’ decisions to supply 
earnings guidance, we first provide evidence indicating that the bundling of a forecast with the 
firm’s earnings announcement follows a spike in volatility. Thus, a volatility rise prior to the 
earnings announcement appears to induce managers to provide guidance along with the earnings 
announcement. And what happens to share volatility after the guidance release? First, in contrast 
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to certain recent research, we find no evidence that the decision to guide in a given quarter 
increases volatility.  In fact, our evidence indicates that on the day of the earnings release, the 
volatility of bundled earnings-guidance releases is not higher than that of unbundled 
announcements, whereas, in the post-announcement days, the volatility decreases of bundled 
releases is higher than unbundled ones. Consistent with managers’ perceptions, guidance appears 
to arrest share volatility. 
Our findings also suggest that firms in more volatile information environments are 
generally reticent to offer guidance, but given a pre-earnings release spike in volatility, 
committed guiders are more likely to jump in with a forecast seemingly in an effort to calm the 
market.  Subsequent evidence indicates that managers’ efforts do not go unrewarded, as we 
document greater post-announcement run-downs in volatility for disclosing firms.  Taken 
collectively, this evidence supports the view that managers can and do positively shape their 
firms’ information environments with earnings guidance. 
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Appendix A  Variable definitions 
 
We assemble a sample of 107,307 firm-quarter observations for the period of 2001 through 2010 with 
available Compustat, CRSP, I/B/E/S and First Call data.  In tests that require the use of implied volatility 
data (obtained from the standardized options dataset in OptionMetrics), the sample includes 72,123 firm-
quarter observations.  We winsorize all continuous firm-quarter observations at the 1% and 99% levels.  
All regressions include industry fixed effects, which we code based on 2-digit SIC codes. 
 
guidance An indicator variable set to 1 if the firm provided an earnings forecast during the 5-day window surrounding the report date of quarterly earnings. 
negative_fnews An indicator variable set to 1 if bundled=1 and the bundled forecast estimate is less than the pre-forecast prevailing median analyst estimates. 
positive_fnews An indicator variable set to 1 if bundled=1 and the bundled forecast estimate is greater than the pre-forecast prevailing median analyst estimates. 
neutral_fnews An indicator variable set to 1 if bundled=1 and the bundled forecast estimate is equal to the pre-forecast prevailing median analyst estimates. 
cond_fnews 
We also code indicator variables based on Rogers and Van Buskirk (2012)’s approach to 
calculating conditional forecast news.  Specifically, negative_cond_fnews 
(positive_cond_fnews) is an indicator variable set to 1 if the forecast news, conditional 
on expected analyst forecast revisions, is negative (positive). 
guide_cqtr An indicator variable set to 1 if the firm previously provided earnings guidance for the current quarter’s earnings.  
guide_history 
An indicator variable set to 1 if the firm had supplied at least one piece of earnings 
guidance in the First Call data prior to the 5-day window surrounding the current 
quarter’s earnings announcement. 
silent_12q An indicator variable set to 1 if the firm provided no earnings guidance in the prior 12 quarters.  (We also consider 4 and 8 quarters in our analyses.) 
bundled_prior An indicator variable set to 1 if the firm issued an earnings forecast during the 5-day window surrounding the report date of quarterly earnings last quarter. 
surprise Actual earnings minus the prevailing median analyst estimates, deflated by stock price 3 trading days prior to the report date of quarterly earnings. 
p_surprise An indicator variable set to 1 if this quarter’s earnings surprise exceeds +0.0001. 
n_surprise An indicator variable set to 1 if this quarter’s earnings surprise falls below -0.0001. 
loss An indicator variable set to 1 if actual earnings is less than 0. 
dispersion The standard deviation of prevailing analyst estimates for the current period’s earnings. 
prior_ret The cumulative stock return over the 90-day period ending 3 trading days prior to the report date of quarterly earnings. 
mve The market value of equity (i.e., price multiplied by shares outstanding) measured 3 trading days prior to the report date of quarterly earnings.   
numest The number of analysts with outstanding estimates 3 trading days prior to the report date of quarterly earnings.   
propmb The proportion of the previous 4 quarters that the firm’s reported earnings met or exceeded analysts’ prevailing median consensus estimates. 
svol_level The standard deviation of daily stock returns over the 90-day period ending 3 trading days prior to the report date of quarterly earnings. 
ivol_level The average level of implied volatility (ivol) for a 30-day duration, at-the-money option in the 5 trading days prior to the report date of quarterly earnings. 
∆ivol_pre15d 
The natural logarithm of the ratio of ivol measured at the close of the day prior to the 
report date of quarterly earnings to ivol measured 15 days prior to the report date of 
quarterly earnings (i.e., the change in ivol in the 15 days prior to the earnings release). 
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∆ivol_pre3d 
The natural logarithm of the ratio of ivol measured at the close of the day prior to the 
report date of quarterly earnings to ivol measured 3 days prior to the report date of 
quarterly earnings (i.e., the change in ivol in the 3 days prior to the earnings release). 
∆ivol_rdq 
The natural logarithm of the ratio of ivol measured at the close of the report date of 
quarterly earnings to ivol measured at the close of the day prior to the report date of 
quarterly earnings (i.e., the change in ivol on the day of the earnings release). 
∆ivol_post3d 
The natural logarithm of the ratio of ivol measured 3 days after the report date of 
quarterly earnings to ivol measured as of the close of the report date of quarterly earnings 
(i.e., the change in ivol in the 3 days following the earnings release). 
∆ivol_post15d 
The natural logarithm of the ratio of ivol measured 15 days after the report date of 
quarterly earnings to ivol measured as of the close of the report date of quarterly earnings 
(i.e., the change in ivol in the 15 days following the earnings release). 
vix_level The level of the Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index on the report date of quarterly earnings. 
∆vix The natural logarithm of the ratio of vix_level measured 1 day after the earnings announcement to the vix_level measured 1 day prior to the earnings announcement. 
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Table 1  Descriptive statistics 
 
The sample consists of 107,307 firm-quarter observations from 2001 through 2010.  Panel A provides 
descriptive statistics for the full sample, while Panel B provides descriptive statistics for the full sample 
partitioned based on the presence of an earnings forecast during the 5-day window surrounding the 
announcement of earnings. In Panel B, •••,••,• denote instances where the two subsamples differ 
significantly at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively, for two-tailed tests.  Please refer to the Appendix 
for variable definitions. 
 
Panel A: Full sample (n=107,307) 
 
 Mean Median Min Q1 Q3 Max 
bundled 0.307 0 0 0 1 1 
silent_12q 0.560 1 0 0 1 1 
guide_cqtr 0.269 0 0 0 1 1 
bundled_prior 0.310 0 0 0 1 1 
surprise -0.006 0.000 -68.724 -0.001 0.002 7.146 
p_surprise 0.581 1 0 0 1 1 
n_surprise 0.305 0 0 0 1 1 
loss 0.201 0 0 0 0 1 
dispersion 0.032 0.014 0.000 0.003 0.034 0.382 
prior_ret 0.033 0.040 -0.796 -0.079 0.152 0.851 
mve ($mil) 4.701 0.778 0.001 0.262 2.614 522.711 
numest 5.482 4.000 1.000 2.000 7.000 43.000 
propmb 0.702 0.750 0.000 0.500 1.000 1.000 
 
Panel B: Full sample, partitioned based on bundled earnings-guidance 
 
 No guidance=0 (n=74,397)  Guidance=1 (n=32,910)  Differences 
 Mean Median Std. Dev.  Mean Median St. Dev.  Mean Median 
silent_12q 0.782 1 0.413  0.061 0 0.239  ••• ••• 
guide_cqtr 0.114 0 0.317  0.620 1 0.485  ••• ••• 
bundled_prior 0.086 0 0.281  0.816 1 0.388  ••• ••• 
surprise -0.010 0.000 0.379  0.001 0.001 0.034  ••• ••• 
p_surprise 0.542 1 0.498  0.671 1 0.470  ••• ••• 
n_surprise 0.354 0 0.478  0.194 0 0.395  ••• ••• 
loss 0.253 0 0.435  0.083 0 0.277  ••• ••• 
dispersion 0.036 0.014 0.064  0.022 0.013 0.036  ••• ••• 
prior_ret 0.035 0.040 0.252  0.029 0.039 0.209  ••• ••• 
mve 3.775 0.594 15.519  6.796 1.355 21.981  ••• ••• 
numest 5.034 3.000 4.989  6.495 5.000 5.314  ••• ••• 
propmb 0.655 0.750 0.287  0.808 0.750 0.230  ••• ••• 
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Table 2  Correlations 
 
The sample consists of 107,307 firm-quarter observations from 2001 through 2010.  We present Pearson (Spearman) correlations below (above) 
the diagonal. Please refer to the Appendix for variable definitions. 
 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] 
1] silent_12q 1 -0.55 -0.76 0.19 0.03 0.01 -0.21 -0.19 -0.25 0.12 0.13 -0.05 -0.03 0.01 0.09 0.09 
2] guide_cqtr -0.55 1 0.61 -0.21 -0.08 -0.03 0.14 0.15 0.25 -0.03 -0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 -0.08 -0.09 
3] bundled_prior -0.76 0.61 1 -0.20 -0.02 -0.01 0.23 0.18 0.26 -0.15 -0.15 0.05 0.03 -0.02 -0.09 -0.08 
4] |surprise| 0.12 -0.11 -0.14 1 0.12 0.01 -0.36 -0.21 -0.27 0.32 0.28 -0.06 -0.02 0.00 0.03 0.06 
5] dispersion 0.11 -0.11 -0.11 0.19 1 -0.02 0.31 0.57 -0.05 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.07 0.04 0.05 
6] prior_ret 0.01 -0.04 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 1 0.06 -0.03 0.00 -0.04 -0.12 -0.07 -0.01 0.02 0.01 0.04 
7] mve -0.07 0.05 0.08 -0.07 0.04 0.00 1 0.56 0.24 -0.46 -0.55 0.03 0.01 -0.13 -0.02 0.00 
8] numest -0.15 0.13 0.15 -0.12 0.18 -0.04 0.33 1 0.19 -0.10 -0.12 0.02 0.00 -0.04 -0.07 -0.05 
9] propmb -0.25 0.25 0.25 -0.22 -0.12 0.00 0.09 0.17 1 -0.10 -0.09 0.04 0.02 0.00 -0.08 -0.08 
10] svol_level 0.12 -0.04 -0.14 0.42 0.09 -0.03 -0.13 -0.08 -0.13 1 0.87 -0.10 -0.06 0.07 -0.01 -0.04 
11] ivol_level 0.13 -0.03 -0.15 0.25 0.06 -0.16 -0.20 -0.09 -0.11 0.76 1 -0.01 -0.06 0.03 -0.06 -0.11 
12] ∆ivol_pre15d -0.04 0.02 0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.08 0.01 0.01 0.03 -0.09 0.02 1 0.48 -0.25 -0.11 -0.11 
13] ∆ivol_pre3d -0.03 0.01 0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.05 -0.05 0.50 1 -0.26 -0.06 -0.07 
14] ∆ivol_rdq 0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.02 -0.03 0.01 -0.04 -0.03 0.00 0.04 0.01 -0.32 -0.31 1 -0.38 -0.37 
15] ∆ivol_post3d 0.08 -0.07 -0.08 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.00 -0.06 -0.06 0.02 -0.04 -0.11 -0.07 -0.44 1 0.65 
16] ∆ivol_post15d 0.08 -0.09 -0.08 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.01 -0.04 -0.07 -0.01 -0.08 -0.11 -0.07 -0.42 0.67 1 
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Table 3  Volatility and earnings news 
 
The sample consists of 107,307 firm-quarter observations from 2001 through 2010.  Panel A provides 
descriptive statistics for the full sample, while Panel B provides descriptive statistics for the full sample 
partitioned based on the presence of an earnings forecast during the 5-day window surrounding the 
announcement of earnings.  Panel C provides descriptive statistics for the subsample of observations 
where firms have supplied bundled guidance at some time during the past 12 quarters, partitioned based 
on bundled versus non-bundled quarters.  Panel D displays the median value for further partitions of the 
sample based on the sign of earnings news supplied in the earnings release.   denotes instances where 
availability of OptionMetrics data reduces sample size to 72,123.  In Panels B, C and D, •••,••,• denote 
instances where the two subsamples differ significantly at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively, for 
two-tailed tests.  Please refer to the Appendix for variable definitions. 
 
Panel A: Full sample (n=107,307) 
 
 Mean Median Q1 Q3 
svol_level 0.030 0.025 0.017 0.036 
ivol_level 0.490 0.442 0.326 0.606 
∆ivol_pre15d 0.030 0.021 -0.061 0.114 
∆ivol_pre3d 0.018 0.012 -0.040 0.072 
∆ivol_rdq -0.025 -0.018 -0.096 0.047 
∆ivol_post3d -0.061 -0.044 -0.139 0.027 
∆ivol_post15d -0.066 -0.059 -0.167 0.038 
vix_level 0.223 0.205 0.150 0.254 
 
Panel B: Full sample, partitioned based on bundledguidance 
 
 bundledNon-guiding=0 
(n=74,397) 
 bundledGuiding=1 (n=32,910)  Differences 
 Mean Median St. Dev.  Mean Median St. Dev.  Mean Median 
svol_level 0.032 0.026 0.022  0.026 0.022 0.015  ••• ••• 
ivol_level 0.514 0.468 0.235  0.448 0.408 0.199  ••• ••• 
∆ivol_pre15d 0.023 0.015 0.190  0.042 0.032 0.162  ••• ••• 
∆ivol_pre3d 0.016 0.010 0.115  0.022 0.017 0.108  ••• ••• 
∆ivol_rdq -0.023 -0.017 0.167  -0.028 -0.019 0.161  ••• ••• 
∆ivol_post3d -0.051 -0.037 0.179  -0.080 -0.058 0.174  ••• ••• 
∆ivol_post15d -0.054 -0.050 0.208  -0.086 -0.073 0.193  ••• ••• 
vix_level 0.225 0.207 0.105  0.217 0.198 0.106  ••• ••• 
 
Panel C: Recent guidance subsample, partitioned based on bundledguidance 
 
 bundledNon-guiding=0 
(n=16,251) 
 bundledGuiding=1 (n=30,917)  Differences 
 Mean Median St. Dev.  Mean Median St. Dev.  Mean Median 
svol_level 0.031 0.026 0.020  0.025 0.022 0.014  ••• ••• 
ivol_level 0.503 0.458 0.232  0.442 0.403 0.195  ••• ••• 
∆ivol_pre15d 0.027 0.018 0.187  0.043 0.033 0.161  ••• ••• 
∆ivol_pre3d 0.019 0.012 0.113  0.023 0.017 0.108  ••• ••• 
∆ivol_rdq -0.021 -0.013 0.166  -0.029 -0.020 0.161  ••• ••• 
∆ivol_post3d -0.062 -0.043 0.178  -0.081 -0.059 0.173  ••• ••• 
∆ivol_post15d -0.071 -0.062 0.208  0.217 0.195 0.108  ••• ••• 
vix_level 0.221 0.203 0.098  0.217 0.195 0.108  ••• ••• 
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Table 3  Volatility and earnings news (continued) 
 
Panel D: Full sample, partitioned based on nature of earnings news 
 
    
 Earnings news =   
 Negative 
(n=32,701) 
 Neutral 
(n=12,223) 
 Positive 
(n=62,383) 
 
 Guidingbu
ndled=1 
(n=6,387) 
Non-
guidingbun
dled=0 
(n=26,314) 
 
 Guidingbu
ndled=1 
(n=4,456) 
Non-
guidingbu
ndled=0 
(n=7,767) 
 
 Guidingbu
ndled=1 
(n=22,067) 
Non-
guidingbun
dled=0 
(n=40,316) 
 
 
svol_level 0.022 0.028 •••  0.022 0.026 •••  0.022 0.025 •••  
ivol_level 0.410 0.490 •••  0.408 0.459 •••  0.407 0.458 •••  
∆ivol_pre15d 0.029 0.013 •••  0.035 0.019 •••  0.033 0.016 •••  
∆ivol_pre3d 0.015 0.009 •••  0.017 0.011 •••  0.017 0.010 •••  
∆ivol_rdq -0.014 -0.013   -0.012 -0.009 •  -0.022 -0.020 ••  
∆ivol_post3d -0.047 -0.028 •••  -0.051 -0.036 •••  -0.063 -0.041 •••  
∆ivol_post15d -0.064 -0.040 •••  -0.073 -0.059 •••  -0.076 -0.054   
vix_level 0.196 0.208 •••  0.195 0.205 •••  0.199 0.207 •••  
 
 Main take-aways:  
 Volatility differences are definitely present prior to the decision to supply a forecast, which suggests volatility may influence the decision 
to issue a forecast. 
 Volatility level appears to enter differently than volatility changes.  That is, high general levels of volatility are associated with a 
propensity to remain quiet (i.e., bundle=0 when svol, ivol or vix levels are higher), while short-term, recent increases in volatility are 
associated with a propensity to talk with the market (i.e., bundle=1 when ∆ivol is higher). 
 
 Other observations: 
 Conditioning on earnings news, we see less of a tendency to bundle forecasts with negative earnings news: 20% (=6,387/32,701) of 
negative earnings news is bundled with a forecast, while 36% (=4,456/12,223) of neutral and 35% (=22,067/62,383) of positive earnings 
news is bundled with a forecast. 
 Positive earnings news (whether bundled with a forecast or not) appears to receive the biggest drop in ivol on the day of the earnings 
release, despite experiencing roughly the same ‘run-up’ in ivol in the days leading up to the release (see ∆ivol_pre). 
 Bundled earnings news (regardless of sign) appears to be associated with bigger ‘run-downs’ in ivol after the release date (see ∆ivol_post). 
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Table 4  Volatility and forecast news 
 
The sample consists of 107,307 firm-quarter observations from 2001 through 2010.  This table supplies median values of volatility level and 
changes surrounding the report date of quarterly earnings for the full sample partitioned based on the presence of a bundled forecast and the nature 
of both the earnings and forecast news.   denotes instances where availability of OptionMetrics data reduces sample size to 72,123.  Please refer to 
the Appendix for variable definitions. 
 
 Earnings news =  
 Negative 
(n=32,701) 
 Neutral 
(n=12,223) 
 
Positive 
(n=62,383) 
 
 Guide 
=1 
No-
Guide 
=0 
Guide 
=1 
No-
Guide 
=0 
Guide 
=1 
No-
Guide 
=0 
 
Forecast news = Neg. Neut. Pos. None  Neg. Neut. Pos. None  Neg. Neut. Pos. None  n= 3,940 1,383 1,064 26,314 2,550 1,131 775 7,767 10,724 4,940 6,403 40,316  
 12% 4% 3% 81%  21% 9% 6% 64%  17% 8% 10% 65%  
svol_level 0.022 0.023 0.020 0.028 
 
0.023 0.024 0.021 0.026 
 
0.022 0.023 0.021 0.025  
ivol_level 0.417 0.423 0.369 0.490 0.417 0.416 0.374 0.459 0.411 0.417 0.390 0.458  
∆ivol_pre15d 0.028 0.029 0.033 0.013 0.035 0.033 0.037 0.019 0.030 0.029 -0.039 0.016  
∆ivol_pre3d 0.014 0.017 0.013 0.009 0.018 0.017 0.013 0.011 0.016 0.017 0.019 0.010  
∆ivol_rdq -0.014 -0.005 -0.022 -0.013 -0.014 -0.008 -0.011 -0.009 -0.023 -0.014 -0.027 -0.020  
∆ivol_post3d -0.048 -0.050 -0.044 -0.028 -0.051 -0.053 -0.051 -0.036 -0.065 -0.062 -0.063 -0.041  
∆ivol_post15d -0.067 -0.061 -0.054 -0.040 -0.074 -0.074 -0.062 -0.059 -0.077 -0.080 -0.074 -0.054  
vix_level 0.201 0.182 0.186 0.208 0.202 0.187 0.190 0.205 0.203 0.193 0.195 0.207  
 
 Main take-aways: 
 The choice to bundle appears associated with larger run-ups in volatility prior to the earnings announcement (see ∆ivol_pre), regardless of 
the sign of earnings or forecast news.  This is consistent with both: (1) the market anticipating the bundling (and the additional news and 
accompanying ‘conversation’ of it) and/or (2) the choice to bundle stemming (at least in part) from managers’ attempts to quiet the recent 
craziness.  That is, firms in more volatile environments are generally reticent to bundle (as evidenced by the higher ivol and svol levels), 
but given a recent spike in ivol, they appear more likely to jump in.   
 At the same time, the choice to bundle is also associated with seemingly larger run-downs in volatility, particularly for the 
positive/positive earnings/forecast news combination.  Nonetheless, ∆ivol_post is more negative across the board for bundled. 
 Taken collectively, the above results are inconsistent with the notion that guidance causes volatility to increase.  Guidance does not appear 
to cause additional volatility. 
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Table 5  Does volatility affect the likelihood of supplying a forecast?   
 
The sample consists of 107,307 firm-quarter observations from 2001 through 2010; the availability of 
OptionMetrics data reduces sample size to 72,123 in some specifications. In specification [4], ∆ivol_pre = 
∆ivol_pre3d.  In specifications [5] and [6], ∆ivol_pre = ∆ivol_pre15d.  In specification [6], the sample is 
limited to observations where firms have supplied bundled guidance at some time during the past 12 
quarters.  •••,••,• denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively, for two-tailed tests.  
Please refer to the Appendix for variable definitions 
 
 Dependent variable = bundle. 
Marginal effect (p-value below) 
             
 [1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5]  [6]  
             
uide_cqtr + 0.083 ••• 0.084 ••• 0.085 ••• 0.055 ••• 0.055 ••• 0.071 ••• 
 <.0001  <.0001 <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  
undled_prior + 0.313 ••• 0.312 ••• 0.343 ••• 0.213 ••• 0.213 ••• 0.328 ••• 
 <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  
_surprise + 0.012 ••• 0.012 ••• 0.016 ••• 0.016 ••• 0.015 ••• 0.026 ••• 
 <.0001  <.0001  0.001  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  
_surprise  -0.005  -0.006 • 0.002  0.003  0.002  -0.003  
 0.169  0.079  0.693  0.404  0.674  0.702  
urprise|  -0.470 ••• -0.292 ••• -0.404 ••• -0.634 ••• -0.582 ••• -0.861 ••• 
 <.0001  0.0003  0.005  <.0001  <.0001  0.0003  
oss  -0.051 ••• -0.046 ••• -0.057 ••• -0.051 ••• -0.050 ••• -0.082 ••• 
 <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  
ispersion  -0.200 ••• -0.190 ••• -0.210 ••• -0.158 ••• -0.155 ••• -0.190 ••• 
 <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  0.0004  
rior_ret ? -0.009 •• -0.009 •• -0.027 ••• -0.029 ••• -0.027 ••• -0.061 ••• 
 0.034  0.046  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  
og(mve) + 0.012 ••• 0.010 ••• 0.008 ••• 0.008 ••• 0.008 ••• 0.015 ••• 
 <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  
og(numest) + 0.005 ••• 0.007 ••• 0.003  -0.003 • -0.002  -0.006 •• 
 0.001  <.0001  0.299  0.067  0.138  0.036  
ropmb + 0.055 ••• 0.056 ••• 0.059 ••• 0.051 ••• 0.049 ••• 0.061 ••• 
 <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  
ear ? -0.004 ••• -0.004 ••• -0.005 ••• -0.003 ••• 0.003 ••• -0.005 ••• 
 <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  0.001  <.0001  
vol_level    -0.643 •••      
   <.0001          
vol_level     -0.049 ••• -0.028 ••• -0.032 ••• -0.106 ••• 
     <.0001  0.0003  <.0001  <.0001  
ivol_pre   +     0.027 •• 0.052 ••• 0.085 ••• 
       0.022  <.0001  <.0001  
ilent_12q      -0.198 ••• -0.197 •••  
       <.0001  <.0001    
ivol_pre 
silent_12q      -0.059 0.013
•• -0.059 
<.0001 
•••  
       
ndustry controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
VIX controls  No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
             
             
 107,307 107,307 72,123 72,123 72,123 47,168 
seudo R2  63.3% 63.4% 63.9% 67.7% 67.6% 33.8% 
ROC area  0.920 0.920 0.916 0.928 0.929 0.795 
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Table 6  What explains changes in volatility on the date of earnings announcements?  
 
The sample consists of 107,307 firm-quarter observations from 2001 through 2010; the availability of 
OptionMetrics data reduces sample size to 72,123 in some specifications.   Results are robust to 
categorizing forecast news based on conditional analyst forecast revisions, as described in Rogers and 
Van Buskirk (2012). •••,••,• denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively, for two-tailed 
tests.  Please refer to the Appendix for variable definitions. 
 
 Dependent variable = ∆ivol_rdq. 
Coefficient (p-value below) 
             
Earnings news =  Negative (n=32,701) 
Neutral 
(n=12,223) 
 
 
Positive 
(n=62,383) 
              
 [1] [2] [3] [4]  [5] [6] 
              
urprise| + 0.142 ••• 0.143 ••   0.087  0.092  
 0.010  0.010       0.244  0.221  
undled ? 0.0013   -0.002   0.001   
 0.385    0.539     0.799    
egative_fnews ?   0.003   -0.003    -0.002  
   0.331    0.436     0.299  
ositive_fnews ?   -0.006   -0.007    -0.003  
   0.279    0.261     0.277  
eutral_fnews ?   0.008   0.004    0.011 ••• 
   0.171    0.452     0.001  
g(mve)  -0.014 ••• -0.014 ••• -0.015 ••• -0.015 ••• -0.017 ••• -0.017 ••• 
 <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001   <.0001  <.0001  
g(numest)  0.001  0.001  0.007 ••• 0.007 ••• 0.009 ••• 0.009 ••• 
 0.488  0.492  0.002  0.002   <.0001  <.0001  
spersion  -0.075 ••• -0.074 ••• -0.178 ••• -0.176 ••• -0.088 ••• -0.088 ••• 
 <.0001  <.0001  0.001  0.001   <.0001  <.0001  
g(∆vix) + 0.166 ••• 0.166 ••• 0.130 ••• 0.130 ••• 0.149 ••• 0.149 ••• 
 <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001   <.0001  <.0001  
x + 0.111 ••• 0.111 ••• 0.099 ••• 0.099 ••• 0.078 ••• 0.076 ••• 
 <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001   <.0001  <.0001  
ol_level ? -0.091 ••• -0.091 ••• -0.071 ••• -0.072 ••• -0.083 ••• -0.084 ••• 
 <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001   <.0001  <.0001  
vol_pre3d  -0.471 ••• -0.471 ••• -0.420 ••• -0.420 ••• -0.452 ••• -0.452 ••• 
 <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001   <.0001  <.0001  
        
ndustry controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
             
       
djusted R2  13.4% 13.4% 12.2% 12.2% 12.8% 12.8% 
 
 
Main take-away: The act of bundling earnings news with guidance does not appear to increase volatility 
on the report date of quarterly earnings. 
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Table 7  What explains changes in volatility following earnings announcements?  
 
The sample consists of 107,307 firm-quarter observations from 2001 through 2010; the availability of 
OptionMetrics data reduces sample size to 72,123 in some specifications.   Results are robust to 
categorizing forecast news based on conditional analyst forecast revisions, as described in Rogers and 
Van Buskirk (2012). •••,••,• denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively, for two-tailed 
tests.  Please refer to the Appendix for variable definitions. 
 
 Dependent variable = ∆ivol_post. 
Coefficient (p-value below)
             
Earnings news =  Negative (n=32,701) 
Neutral 
(n=12,223) 
 
 
Positive 
(n=62,383) 
              
 [1] [2] [3] [4]  [5] [6] 
              
urprise| + 0.189 ••• 0.190 •••   0.187 ••• 0.044  
 <.0001  <.0001       0.009  0.541  
undled ? -0.016 •••  -0.016 •••  -0.020 •••  
 <.0001    <.0001     <.0001    
egative_fnews ?   -0.013 •••  -0.014 •••   -0.019 ••• 
   <.0001    0.001     <.0001  
ositive_fnews ?   -0.024 •••  -0.029 •••   -0.019 ••• 
   <.0001    <.0001     <.0001  
eutral_fnews ?   -0.017 •••  -0.011 ••   -0.012 ••• 
   0.002    0.039     <.0001  
g(mve)  -0.011 ••• -0.011 ••• -0.014 ••• -0.014 ••• -0.013 ••• -0.011 ••• 
 <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001   <.0001  <.0001  
g(numest)  -0.005 ••• -0.005 ••• -0.004 ••• -0.005 ••• -0.009 ••• -0.009 ••• 
 0.004  0.003  0.039  0.035   <.0001  <.0001  
spersion  -0.029 • -0.028 • -0.113 ••• -0.111 ••• -0.001  0.014  
 0.100  0.099  0.026  0.030   0.954  0.325  
g(∆vix) + 0.188 ••• 0.188 ••• 0.186 ••• 0.186 ••• 0.182 ••• 0.197 ••• 
 <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001   <.0001  <.0001  
x + 0.114 ••• 0.114 ••• 0.185 ••• 0.186 ••• 0.169 ••• 0.157 ••• 
 <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001   <.0001  <.0001  
ol_level ? -0.090 ••• -0.090 ••• -0.107 ••• -0.108 ••• -0.111 ••• -0.085 ••• 
 <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001   <.0001  <.0001  
vol_pre3d  -0.374 ••• -0.374 ••• -0.357 ••• -0.357 ••• -0.360 ••• -0.264 ••• 
 <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001   <.0001  <.0001  
vol_rdq  -0.557 ••• -0.557 ••• -0.557 ••• -0.558 ••• -0.592 ••• -0.607 ••• 
 <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001   <.0001  <.0001  
        
ndustry controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
             
       
djusted R2  25.7% 25.7% 26.9% 27.0% 31.5% 33.5% 
 
 
Main Take-away: The act of bundling earnings news with guidance does not appear to increase volatility 
in the post-earnings-announcement period – indeed, if anything, the opposite. 
 
 
 
